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ABSTRACT

Most current models in health psychology assume
that self-esteem (SE) mediates stress and stress ad

versely affects physical health.

This study examined

the direct effect of SE on blood pressure (BP), choles

terol, thyroxine and leukocyte levels.

were used for evaluation.

Medical records

In a pilot study, a SE

measure was developed using selected items from the
Beck Depression Inventory, Taylor Manifest Anxiety
Scale and SCL-R-90 along with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem

Scale.

The final set of SE items were chosen by item

analysis and used to analyze the physiological data.
Defensiveness (DEF) from the Marlowe-Crowne Social

Desirability Scale controlled the self-reported data.
SE was only significant in the interaction between SE
and DEF on diastolic BP.

Neither SE or DEF had signif

icant effects on either systolic BP, cholesterol, or
leukocyte levels.

Results demonstrate the effects of

DEF and NA in self-reports is unrelated to actual

findings, in contrast to self-reported health indices.
The lack of findings may reflect the measure of SE used

in the present study.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been resurgent interest

in self-esteem.

In 1986, California passed AB-3659,

Chapter 1065 which created the State Task Force on
Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility.

This law mandated that each County form a Self-Esteem
Task Force to identify existing successful programs (or
develop new ones) that promote positive self-esteem in
all areas of the population.

Since then several other

states and two countries have followed California's

lead to develop programs to promote high self-esteem in
their communities.

Is self-esteem related to physical health?

Rela

tionships have been found between various other person
ality constellations and physical health, such as Type

A personality type (Rosenman, 1978), the repressive
coping style (Weinberger, 1990), depression (Rice,
1987), anxiety (Silthanen, 1984), negative affect
(Campbell & Fehr, 1990), and dispositional optimism

(Schier, Matthews, Owens, Magovern, Lefebre, Abbott &

Carver, 1989).

These personality measures are likely

to be strong correlates of self-esteem; however, the

relationships of global self-esteem to physical health
measures such as blood pressure, cholesterol, thyroxine

or leuckocyte levels have not been directly investigat
ed.

The relationship between self-esteem and psycho
logical health has been well dociimented {e.g., Cramer,
1985; Miller, Kreitman, Ingham & Sashidharan, 1989).

For example. Miller, et al., (1989) investigated types
of life events associated with low self-esteem, the

role of life events and self-esteem in onset of psychi
atric disorders, and the significance of prior psychi
atric disorders in determining onset of current psychi
atric disorders in 340 women.

The onset of major

depression was best predicted by an interaction between
high total stress and low self-esteem.

Cramer (1985)

found in two studies that subjects who had high selfesteem suffered less from various psychological symp
toms.

One area in" which the relationship between selfesteem and physical health has been addressed indirect

ly is through its mediation of the stress effects on

physical health (Brown, 1988; Greenberg, 1990).

Brown

(1988), for one, demonstrated that self-concept mediat

ed the effects of stressful events on physical health.

Persons with "uncertain" self-concepts were more vul
nerable to stress-induced deteriorations in health than

those with a strong sense of identity.

Greenberg

(1990) states that the "every essence of stress manage

ment requires confidence in yourself and in your deci

sions to control your life effectively" (p. 135).
Another area that is related to the possible

relationship between self-esteem and physical health is
a large body of research studying major life events and
physical health.

In general, this research shows that

major life events adversely affect physical health.
These results have been found in different populations

with a variety of methodologies (for reviews, see

Jemmott & Locke, 1984; Maes, Vingerhoets, & Van Heck,
1987).

Negative life events have been shown to have

adverse effects on physical health, and the self-con
cept is a mediator for those effects (Brown, 1988).
Positive life events have been shown to increase ill

ness in subjects with low self-esteem who may fear
success may be shortlived or not controllable, whereas
positive life events have been linked to better health
among subjects with high self-esteem (Brown & McGill,
1989).

Central to mediating the stress incurred from life

events are perceptions of control over them.

A good

deal of research indicates that perceptions of control

also promote physical well-being, especially during
stressful times, such as negative life events (for

reviews, see Rodin, 1986; Taylor, 1986).

Not only are

controllable events seen as less stressful than uncon

trollable ones (Brown & Siegel, 1988), but also many of
the cognitive, affective, and motivational deficits
that accompany exposure to aversive events are reduced
in magnitude when individuals believe they have a
controlling response (Seligman, 1975).

Physiological

reactivity also appears to be reduced when individuals
believe that stressful events can be controlled (Frank

enhaeuser, 1981).

Persons of high self-esteem may have

increased feelings of control over themselves and their

environment, hence, have lower physiological reactivi
ty.

As an example of perceptions of control mediating
the stress of a life event, Schier, et al. (1989)

investigated the perceptions of dispositional optimism
in which control is theorized as playing an important
role in 51 men who experienced coronary artery bypass
surgery.

They found that dispositional optimism was

associated with faster rates of recovery and return to

normal life activities, but also with the quality of
postsurgical life.
Thus, it appears that self-esteem mediates the
effects of stress and life events, and there is abun
dant literature that documents the effects of stress on

physical health (for review, see Rice, 1987).

Whether

the effects of self-esteem on physical health may be

more direct is not known.

The purpose of this study

was not to study the effects of stress or perceived

control, but rather to investigate directly the rela

tionship between self-esteem and selected physiological
measures.

The Self-Concept

According to Rosenberg & Kaplan (1982), the self-

concept is "the totality of the individual's thoughts
and feelings with reference to himself or herself as an

object" (p. xiii).

It is not only what an individual

thinks of her/himself, but also how she/he thinks
others evaluate him/her.

Various theorists have classified the self-concept
into broad areas.

One of the most familiar distinc

tions is between the conscious and unconscious concepts
(through dreams and associations, one may learn one's
underlying thoughts and feelings about oneself).

A

second distinction is between the inner and outer world

of thoughts and feelings or in terms of social exterior

or overt public qualities, that is, self-monitoring or
self-focusing (Rosenberg & Kaplan, 1982).
Another aspect of the self-concept is whether it

is encased in a single-body or extends beyond it.

In

other words, what are the boundaries of the self and how

far does it extend?

Cooley (1902) used the term "to

appropriate" to express the process by which an indi
vidual takes objects into the self.

The self is said

to expand and contract with experience.

New external

elements are incorporated into the self, some even

becoming central while others are devalued and exclud
ed.

The term commonly assigned to this phenomena is

ego-extensions.

William James (1890) describes:

"Our

fame, our children, the work of our hands may be as
dear to us as our bodies are and arouse the same feel

ing as the same acts of reprisal if attacked"

(p.

291).

The elemental components of the self that expand
and contract through experience and incur constant
assessment in terms of cognitive concepts were deline
ated by Markus (1977):

"Self-schemata are cognitive

generalizations about the self, derived from past
experience, that organize and guide the processing of
self-related information contained in the individual's

social experiences" (p. 64).

The self-schemata is the

self-concept because it is one's frame of reference.
It serves as an anchor for adjusting to one's current

daily experience.

Individuals pay attention to certain

things and not others; interpret facts one way rather

than another; accept or reject information about them
selves; and generally respond to the concrete experi
ences of life in terms of their pre-established ideas

of what they are like.

Such self-schemata in Markus'

terms "organize, stimmarize and explain behavior" and it
makes no difference if the component is positive,
negative or neutral.

Self-schemata within an attribu

tion theory framework can be viewed as "implicit theo
ries used by individuals to make sense of their own
past behavior and to direct the course of future behav
ior" (p. 78).

A number of theorists (Epstein, 1973; Lecky, 1945;
Swann, 1987) agree that the self-concept acts largely

to organize and guide personal experience.

It develops

as a conceptual tool that individuals use to understand
their own behavior and the behavior of others toward

them.

Carl Rogers (1959) agrees with these writers

that the structure of the self is shaped through inter

action with the environment, particularly the environ
ment composed of parents and significant others; and

although it is fluid, it retains a patterned, gestalt-

like quality to it.
In more specific terms, self-conceptions (a) aid
in processing personal information (Markus, 1977), (b)

provide individuals a basis for present (Gergen, 1971)

and future behavior (Markus & Nurius, 1986); and (c)
influence the course of social interaction insofar that
individuals react to one another on the basis of iden

tities they project (Swann, 1987).

Collectively, these

functions allow individuals to deal more efficiently
with, and better predict and control, their social
world (Brown & McGill, 1989), or from a functional

framework, well-adjusted individuals might be defined
as efficacious social problem-solvers who experience
little dysphoric affect or self-control problems
(ROsenbaum, 1980).
Self-Esteem

The judgment aspect of the self-concept is selfesteem.

Although self-esteem can be considered to have

various components (Rosenberg & Kaplan, 1982), it is
also acknowledged as a global measure of ah individu

al's self-evaluation (Rosenberg, 1965).

That is, when

individuals consider their intelligence (self-

schemata), the judgment of positive, negative or neu
tral forms the self-esteem about their intelligence.
This judgment then contributes to or affects global

self-esteem in terms of its relative importance to the
self-concept (Kaplan, 1975).

Further, the judgment

involves not only what individuals feel about themself,
but also how they feel others view them (Bandura, 1977).
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Kaplan (1975) states that the desire for selfesteem is universal and characterizes a dominant mo

tive.

In all past and contemporary cultures, self-

esteem characteristically develops as a result of

processes set in motion by the child's initial depend
ence upon others for satisfactions of basic physical

needs present at birth.

However, this is not to say

that the development of self-esteem in inevitable.
According to Kaplan, if the adults in the child's

experience are invariable (uniformly positive/negative
regardless of the child's behavior) or inconsistent

(child's behavior evokes positive responses or some
times negative responses), the child might not learn to

associate particular behaviors on her/his part with
particular adult attitudes toward her/him and thus
might not develop the need for positive attitudinal
responses from others or the need for positive self-

attitudes (the need for other's approval) .v
According to Rogers (1959), the development of

high self-esteem assures the tendency toward becoming
an independent, self-actualized person with a compati

ble self-concept.

This high self-esteem individual is

unlikely to behave in ways which are inconsistent with
the self-concept because this would frustrate the need

for positive self-esteem.

This was confirmed by Rosen

berg's (1965) findings that adolescents with positive

self-esteem had a more stable self-concept over time
that those with negative self-esteem.

Also, Campbell

and Fehr (1988) found that the behavior of high selfesteem subjects via self-reports were consistent and
congruent with partner and observer ratings, whereas
the behavior of low self-esteem subjects was neither
consistent or congruent with partner or observer rat
ings.
Mechanisms Relating Self-^Esteem to Health

Although global self-esteem has never been direct
ly related to health, disruptions to the self-concept
and its effects on self-esteem are known to affect

physical health and illness (Brown & Siegel, 1988;
Frankenhaeuser, 1981; Seligman, 1975).

Although these

mechanisms were not examined in the present study, the

above cited research indicates that perceptions of
control during stressful or aversive life events medi

ate stress and its effects on physical health.

This

implies that a well-adjusted individual feels an abili

ty to predict and control life events, especially

stressful or aversive ones, and that this ability
assists in the development of a strong, stable selfconcept with high self-esteem.

But, what happens to

self-esteem and physical health when life events are

10

perceived as beyond one's control?

What are the condi

tions of disruption of the self-concept and how does
the disruptions affect self-esteem and physical health?
Carl Rogers (1959) states that when incoming
experiences are recognized as incongruent with the
self-concept, the experience becomes a threat to the

individual's self-concept and self-esteem due to the

conflict between his/her self-related perceptions and
actual experience.

As a result, the individual becomes

potentially vulnerable to anxiety and personality
disorganization if the current self-structure is not
maintained.

"This goal is achieved by the perceptual
distortion of the experience in awareness,
in such a way as to reduce the incongruity
between the experience and the structure
of the self, or by the denial of any
experience, thus denying any threat to
the self" (Rogers, 1959, p. 204-205).
Changes to the self-concept have been examined by

several authors (Engle, 1959; Kaplan, 1975).

Kaplan

(1975) describes both a positive self-concept (consist

ing mostly positive self-evaluations) and a negative
self-concept (consisting of mostly negative self-evalu

tions).

Further, individuals appear to change their

self-attitudes over time in a positive direction rather

than in a negative direction.

But, when most subjects'

are faced with experiences that could incur self-deval
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uating responses, a charaGteristic calGulated response
is to increase positive (and defend against negative)
self-evaluation which increases positive (and decreases
negative) self-attitudes.

This may occur through

readjustment of response patterns to more closely

approximate positively valued goals, misperceptions of
attitudes, behaviors, or circiimstances, or a reordering

of values.

However, Engle (1959) reported some stabil

ity of self-concept over a two-year period in high
school students noting that the most change in posi
tive/negative self-concept occurred in the negative

self-concept grouping.
However, readjusted self-evaluations are not the

only defensive mechanism or coping style used to pre
vent disruptions of an established self-concept.

An

alternative method is to repress disruptions to the

self concept.

For example, Weinberger (1990) describes

repressive individuals as "viewing themselves as the
kind of persons who do not experience much subjective
distress seems central to their self-concept" (p. 53).
Haan (1985) states the critical transformation from

suppression to repression occurs when "I prefer not to

think about it" changes to "There is nothing to think
about."

Repressive coping individuals have been found

in a majority of psychophysiological studies to be more
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reactive than consciously distressed subjects (Hare,
1966; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Parsons, Fulgenzi, &

Edelberg, 1969; Scarpetti, 1973), more reactive in
cardiovascular, muscular, electrodermal, and cortical

responses to laboratory stress (Schwartz, 1986), and
hence, more at risk for physical illneSses such as
asthma, hypertension and cancer than nOn-repressive

individuals (Schwartz, 1986)•

Thus, repressive coping

may be a mechanism to maintain high self-esteem that
interferes with physiological functioning.
Another theory addressing self-devaluing selfperceptions that disrupt the self-concept is Higgins'
(1987) self-discrepancy theory in which individuals
distinguish between the "ideal/own self" and

"ideal/other self" and between "ought/own self" and
"ought/other self".

Discrepancies between the

actual/own self and ideal/(own or other) selves lead to

dejection-related emotions, such as sadness, disap
pointment, frustration and shame.

Higgins suggests

that the person believes s/he have been unable to

attain hopes, dreams or aspirations that either the

person has set for him/herself or a significant person
has set for them.

When the discrepancy between actual

and ought self is revealed, the individual experiences

agitation-related emotions, such as fear, anxiety or
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guilt.

In these cases according to Higgins, the person

believes that s/he has failed to live up to standards

set for good, dutiful or responsible behavior set by
oneself or others.

These agitated emotions stem from

the experience of feeling that one is being punished
(by self or others) for not doing what one ought to do.
Higgins (1987) administered a list of traits or

attributes, such as "honest," "hdt-tempered," "friend
ly," easy-going," "sincere," etc. to university under
graduates and then one month later also administered

assessments of depression and anxiety.

As predicted,

actual/ideal discrepancies predicted depression, but

not anxiety; whereas, actual/ought discrepancies pre
dicted anxiety, but not depression.

Students who felt

they were not living to their ideal selves reported
high levels of sadness and depression, whereas those
who felt they were not living up to their ought selves

reported high level of fear and anxiety.
Unfortunately, self-denigration, disruptions to
the self-concept, negative affect, and stress-related

physical illnesses seem to have many sources.

Ogilvie

(1987) examined still a different kind of disturbance to

the self-concept.

Whereas Higgins (1987) focused on

the extent to which the perceived actual self differs

from other positive selves (ideal or ought), Ogilvie
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(1987) examined the extent to which the actual self is
similar to an undesired self.

The undesired self

contains attributes that the person fears, dreads,
hates and actively seeks to exclude from one's experi
ence.

Ogilvie suggests that we may be in closer touch

with our undesired selves because they are rooted in
our past experiences, than our ideal/ought selves which

are more hypothetieal.

Ogilvie obtained university

undergraduate students' characterizations of their
actual, ideal and undesired selves and "measured" the

distance between these positions in a hypothetical
space.

The results indicated that the distance between

a person's ideal and actual selves was negatively
associated with life satisfaction, while the distance

between the undesired and actual selves was positively
associated with life satisfaction.

was larger.

The second effect

This is to say that the distance between

undesired and actual selves was a much stronger predic
tor of life satisfaction than was the distance between

ideal and actual selves.

Ogilvie's findings imply that

if we want to be happy, we will do better avoiding self-

denigration rather than striving to be the way we want
to be.

The physical consequences of this thinking pattern
was shown in an important study by Pearlin and Schooler

15

(1978).

They interviewed 2,300 people from urban

Chicago and found that three psychological traits
(self-esteem, self-denigration and mastery) were cru
cial in protecting against the effects of psychological
stress.

gration.

Of these, the most significant was self-deni

The more frequent the individual had negative

thoughts about self, the greater the stress.

Most

significant was the fact that self-denigration was the
strongest variable for all four of the major life
events assessed in the study (i.e., marital stress,
parenting stress, family financial stress, and work
stress).

Thus, individuals who experience aversive events

strive to maintain a positive self-concept and defend
against negative self-perceptions that would disrupt
their self-concept and lower their self-esteem.

This

may cause them to experience the additional stress of

inability to predict and control the environment incur

ring degrees of self-rejection and failure to maintain

their self-worth.

These self-devaluing responses can

facilitate depression and/or anxiety which would have
implications for physical health.
Identity Disruption as a Model

Thus far, several theorists (Higgins, 1987; Kap
lan, 1975; Ogilvie, 1987) have attempted to describe
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some of the conditions and responses inherent in chang
ing the self-concept.

In essence, when an individual

encounters relatively common or major life events, the

way a person thinks about the self may change.

The

impact of the degree of disturbance in the self-concept
is predicted by the identity disruption model of stress
(Brown, 1987), which holds that the more a life event

changes one's self-cbhcept, the greater the person's
risk for developing illness.

A two-step process is

proposed: a) life events create alterations in identity
and (b) identity disruption has a negative impact on
health.

So far, there are four ways that life events

initiate disturbances in the self-concept.

First, they

V

may cause individuals to abandon an existing identity.
When people graduate from college, they shed the stu

dent identity.

Life events may also require individu

als to adopt new identities.

When individuals marry,

they take on the identity of husband or wife.

Life

events may also disrupt identity by changing the struc
ture of the self-concept.

When one leaves home for the

first time, the identity of a son or daughter may de

cline in importance as new identities rise in promi
nence.

Or, life events may cause an individual to re

evaluate pre-existing identities.

After losing one's

job, for example, the identity of being successful in

17

one's career may be called into question (Brovm &
McGill, 1989).

The functions of self-conceptions suggest two

alternatives by which identity disruption may impair
health.

First, because self-conceptions facilitate

personal information processing and provide clear
guidelines for present and future behaviors, individu

als experiencihg identity disruption must devote extra
attention to those tasks, thus reducing the amount of
energy available for other tasks (Brown & McGill,
1989).

This general depletion of resources could then

limit a person's ability to withstand illness (Selye,
1956).

Secondly, identity disruption may also negatively
affect physical health by undermining one's sense of
control over the environment, weakening the^ identity's

usefulness as a conceptual tool because of the per

ceived inability to predict and control events.

Thus,

a diminution in perceived control may represent another
way identity disruption impairs physical health (Brown
& McGill, 1989).

In summary, the identity disruption model of
stress (Brown, 1987) states the more a life event

changes the way a person thinks about the self, the
greater the person's risk for developing illness.
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Identity disruption may negatively affect physical

health by undermining one's sense of control over the
environment.

This loss of control may have negative

consequences for physical health.

Thus, the relation

ship between self-esteem and physical health can be
mediated by identity and control issues.
Negative Affect;

The Outcome of Disturbance to the

Self-Concept

Another observation by Kaplan (1975) is the asso

ciation between self-devaluing experiences and subjec
tive distress/negative affect (i.e., sadness, anger,

bitterness, tenseness, panic, hopelessness, pressure,
etc.) when, by definition, individuals display negative

affect (NA) in response to negative self-perceptions
and self-evaluations.

The self-esteem motive is in

ferred by relating the affective responses to self-

devaluing experiences, such as characteristic responses
of negative affect to self-devaluing experiences and

positive affect to positive self-evaluation experi
ences.

Watson and Clark (1984) have shown that a number

of diverse personality scales (e.g., trait anxiety, ego
strength, and neuroticism) are measures of the common

stable trait of negative affect.

They stated that

negative affect is the disposition to experience aver
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sive emotional states, and defined high-NA individuals
as those who are "distressed and upset" (p. 465).
Although common measures of depression (e.g.. Beck
Depression Inventory; Beck, 1967) and less severe, more
transient negative mood states correlate substantially

with negative affect (Watson and Clark, 1984), self
esteem is a concomitant of negative affect when it NA
has been shown to be relatively stable over long period
of time (Conley, 1984; Costa & McCrae, 1980; Wells &
Stryker, 1988).

But what is the relationship between low or high
NA and self-esteem or the self-concept?

Is there any

response difference between low or high NA individuals
when they encounter life events?

Research has found a

consistent relationship between subjective distress
(negative affect) and low self-esteem implying congru
ence of the self-esteem motive (Rosenberg, 1965).
Watson and Clark's (1984) found that low NA individuals

are generally better adjusted than high NA individuals,

and they agree with Taylor and Brown's (1988) theory
that the optimistic beliefs of low NA individuals, even

when they are unrealistic, are healthy and adaptive.
This association becomes important when potentially
threatening life events are encountered, as self-con

cept uncertainty and negativity are critical to the
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disposition to experience aversive emotional states

such as depression or anxiety (Campbell & Fehr, 1990).
As noted earlier, NA is assessed by many common person
ality measures, is a measure of maladjustment, low
self-esteem, pessimism and ego-strength (reverse-keyed)
and generally is a diffuse, nonspecific measure of

subjective distress and dissatisfaction that exerts a
pervasive influence in self-report personality assess
ment (Watson & Clark, 1984).

Thus, negative affect can influence an individu
al's self-concept, contribute to low self-esteem, and

affect physical health due to the effects of stress.
Research has shown that LSE individuals are more likely
to experience negative affect, cognitive and behavioral
reactions to failure or negative feedback than HSE
individuals (Brockner, Derr & Laing, 1987; Campbell and

Fairey, 1985; Moreland and Sweeney, 1984).

Brockner

(1983) reviewed a substantial body of research indicat
ing LSE subjects are generally more susceptible to the
effects of self-relevant cues.

Kernis, Brockner and

Frankel (1989) found that in response to negative

feedback, LSE individuals had a greater tendency to
overgeneralize the implications of the negative feed
back to other aspects of their identities than HSE

individuals.

Even repressive copers who by definition
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have rigid control over affect and impulses experience
poor self-regulation of emotions once the defensive
structure is breached.

Megargee, Cook and Mendelsohn

(1967) found in a series of studies that the majority
of individual imprisoned for sudden, extremely violent

acts of aggression are repressive rather than undercon
trolled.

Blackburn (1965) found in another study that

psychiatric patients who were repressive were more
likely referred for treatment because of temper out
bursts or somatic symptoms, such as paralysis or back

pain.

Therefore, in response to failure or negative

feedback, negative affect may contribute to one's low

self-esteem, negative self-concept, and have adverse
effects on physical and mental health as a result of
the stress created by life events.

The relationships between NA, health complaints
and actual health are not so simple.

Watson and Penne

baker (1989) call into question the use of health
scales and other types of physical status measures

because these questionnaires rely on subjective selfreports.

The questionnaires ask subjects to assess how

frequently or intensely they have experienced various
physical symptoms or problems, such as headaches, back

pain, etc.

Although Watson and Pennebaker agree that

these self-reports have been extensively validated
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against hard evidenee of dysfunction (e.g., data from
medical records), they suggest that self-report health

scales have two distinct components:

one is subjective

and psychological, and the other that is objective and
more clearly health related.

In their study, Watson

and Pennebaker tested university employees, students,
and adults from a rural community not affiliated with

the university.

They found that the association be

tween NA and health complaints is quite general and

that NA is related to a broad range of self-reported
physical problems.
Watson and Pennebaker (1989) found little support

for the NA-actual health complaint relationship.

They

found that NA individuals complain about their health,
but showed no hard evidence for poorer health or in
creased mortality.
Further, Watson and Pennebaker (1989) found that

NA was not consistently associated with major or chron

ic health problems, at least not in the populations

they studied.

However, the correlation between NA and

reported somatic problems remained strong in these

samples.

So major health problems were not a signifi

cant cause of high NA in normal subject and such prob
lems could not offer an acceptable explanation for the

NA-health complaint correlations found in their sample.
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Watson and Pennebaker's findings also agreed with
McCrae, Bartone and Gosta (1976) and Tessler and Me

chanic (1978) who found that NA correlated significant
ly with self-rated health, self-rated health has sig

nificantly associated with physicians' ratings, but NA
was unrelated to physicians' ratings.

They noted that

the relation between NA scores and somatic complaining

was strongly linear and continuous.

Despite their

iryriad of complaints, high NA individuals showed no
increased frequency of physician or health center
visits.

In order to explain these results, Watson and

Fennebaker present recent theory and research that high
NA subjects are hypervigilant and scan the world for

impending trouble (Tellegen, 1985).

The hypervigilance

of NA subjects may help explain their increased somatic
complaining in two ways.

First, high NAs may be more

apt to notice or attend to normal body sensations and

minor aches and pains.

Secondly, because their per

sistent scanning is anxiety-based, high NAS may inter
pret normal symptoms as painful or pathological.
Several studies have indicated that high NA subjects

interpret airbiguous stimuli in a negative or threaten
ing manner (Goodstein, 1954; Haney, 1973; and Watson &
Clark, 1984).

The review of extensive evidence demonstrating
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that NA is associated with a broad range of subjective
complaints and that NA highly correlates with self-

reports of physical symptoms suggests an expansion of
the conception of NA.

Rather than just a disposition

of negative emotion, NA is more a general trait of
somatopsychic distress (Watson and Pennebaker, 1989)
which is self-reported distress that represents a
single pervasive trait that is expressed through a
broad range of negative affect states and somatic

complaints.

Thus,, it is possible that self-esteem may be
related to measures of somatic complaints, but whether
it is related to actual and objective measures of
physical health is unknown.

Therefore, individuals'

self-deceptive traits must be considered in any selfreported measure used in order to obtain a reliable

uncontaminated estimate of any personality measure
including self-esteem.
The Role of Defensiveness in the Self-Concept

Dimensions discussed by Turner (1976) regarding
authentic or inauthentic regions of the self are impor
tant to this discussion.

Certain aspects of ourselves

do not reflect what we feel we really are.

Some parts

of the self are experiences of "the real self" or "true
me," whereas others are viewed as more "superficial,"

25

"artificial," or "alien".

The behavior we exhibit in a

social setting may not be a true representation of what
we really feel about ourselves.

We build up concepts

of what we are like and experience qualities or actions
contrary to these as "inauthentic" or "unreal".
Turner (1976) presents a question of which parts
of the self are experienced as more real, genuine or
authentic than others.

He suggests that this may be

dependent on historical circumstances.

At an earlier

time, people felt that the real self was expressed in

fulfilling one's self social roles, accepting responsi
bility for one's decisions, setting high standards of

behavior and living with ethical principles.

Today, on

the other hand, the real self tends to be recognized as

an impulse; that is spontaneous, unreflective, emotion
al and free of facade.

According to Turner, this

historical change should not be perceived as people
being closer to their real self in different terms.

They just construct it differently.
Berger, Levin, Jacobson and Millham (1977), howev

er, discuss the highly ritualized nature of social

behavior and notes that individuals manage impressions
with each performance they enact.

They state that even

the most "spontaneous" situations are mere role-play
designed to manage the impressions of others.
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However,

there are conceptions of individuals who often do not
recognize their ovm affective reactions.

This viewpoint only becomes tenable within certain
perspectives on the nature of emotion.

Gazzaniga

(1985), among others, has noted that much of 2,000

years of Western thought has urged us to view the brain

as creating a unified cognitive process.

Emotions were

formulated as the "interactions between the arousal

system and the cognitive-interpretive system" (Mandler,
1975, p. 65), where the cognitive system both incites

the affective arousal and determines its meaning.

This

model leaves little room for self-deception about one's
emotional states (Sarbin, 1981; Szabados, 1985).

If

the affect system is thought incapable of independent
assessment of sensory information, one's emotional

state becomes whatever the "cognitive-interpretive

system" decides it is (Schachter & Singer, 1962).
However, recent work on the complex nature of

hioman information processing and brain subsystems
(Fodor, 1983; Gazzaniga, 1985; Hilgard, 1986; McClel

land & Rumelhart, 1986) provides a very different

understanding of human nature.

A psychobiological

perspective suggests that affects emanate, at least in
part, from sub-cortical centers that are semi-autono

mous from verbal information processing (MacLean, 1975;
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Panksepp, 1982).

MacLean (1975) states that our

"paleomainrtialian brain" including the liittsic system has
its "own special kind of intelligence" and can function

somewhat independently from more recently developed
neocortical centers and notes that this phenomena "may
partly account for conflicts between what we affective
ly 'feel' and what we 'know'" (p. 81).

Affective specialization within the neocortex has
also been demonstrated.

The frontal region of the

right cerebral hemisphere, which is connected to the

limbic system, seems to be particularly activated
during the generation and processing of many negative
affects (Davidson, 1984).

Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that the

emotion system interacting with other subsystems is
capable of conducting its own assessments of sensory
information (Izard, 1984; Leventhal, 1984).

LeDoux

(1986) has recently reviewed neurological findings that
sensory messages are transmitted directly to regions of

the limbic system without initially being relayed
through the neocortex which is in accord with MacLean's

(1975) findings.

It is well-known that the emotion

system, in part, specializes in anticipating whether

situations may require significant psychophysiological
preparation, such as for flight/fear response, physical
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coinbat or loss of deprivation/sadness (Schwartz, Wein
berger Sc. Singer, 1981).
How do we as individuals know which emotion is

appropriate to the situation?

Recent research (Rose

man, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) has begun to model
types of schematic processing (Leventhal, 1984) that

the emotion system employs in determining what specific
patterns of emotion seem warranted.

For example,

sadness seems to reflect an assessment that an unpleas

ant situation is controlled by interpersonal circum
stances where the individual can do nothing to change
it.

There is no direct introspective access to how the

emotion system constructs these appraisals; instead, we
rely on subjective experiences of resulting emotions

(Schwartz & Weinberger, 1980) and on inferences based
on implicit theories about what it must be doing

(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).

From observations of split-

brain patients, Gazzaniga (1985) actually claims to

have identified an interpretive system with the left
hemisphere that specializes in constructing explanations

for behaviors and emotional responses generated by
other modules within the brain.

Although we have a preliminary understanding of
the complimentary dynamics of the cognitive-interpre
tive and affect systems, we do know that they can
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respond very differently to the same situation.

An

exaitple is how they react to inputs from another brain

subsystem, i.e., the one that produces visual imagery
(Kosslyn, 1987).

Having individuals image a threaten

ing scene of a disturbing motion picture reliably
incites specific patterns of emotion including differ
entiated autonomic Changes and facial expressions, even

though the person "knows" that the images pose no real
threat (Lang, 1979; Schwartz, Weinberger & Singer,
1981).

Wolpe (1978) also noticed from a behavioral

perspective that neurotic patients are often afraid in

situations they acknowledge not to be objectively
dangerous imagery.

This information is consistent with

data suggesting that conditioning of affective re

sponses can occur without involvement of the higher
cortex (LeDoux, 1986).

Thus, emotional responses to

some degree have their own integrity, even when the
cognitive-interpretive system considers them irrational
or inappropriate (Ellis, 1987).

Current psychobiological research suggest that our

cognitive-interpretive and emotion systems can generate
quite discrepant assessments of the same stimuli.
Commonplace self-perceptions such as "I am really
feeling anxious even though I know there is no reason
to be" may be a valid reflection of the modular nature
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of hioman information processing.

Psychologists readily

admit that not all individuals readily tolerate these

types of discrepancies suggesting that some invoke
defenses under these circxamstances and self-deceptively
reach false conclusions such as "I am not feeling
anxious because there is no reason to be."

Generally/ Dennett (1969) outlined two essential

types of awareness necessary to self-deception.

First,

individuals are aware of a proposition if they can talk
about it.

Secondly, the individual is aware of a

proposition if they cannot talk about it, but an ob
server could claim with justification that they are
considering that belief or proposition in their behav

ior.

In psychoanalytic terms, the proposition is

either conscious or unconscious.

Unconscious aware

ness, according to Dennett, is defined as the second
condition, but not the first because the individual

cannot sincerely recognize their behavior, but an
observer can reliably infer it.

Two additional criteria are necessary to conclude
that information is excluded from consciousness because

of a defensive process.
potentially available.

First, the information must be
Second, there must be clear

motivation for keeping it out of one's awareness
(Weinberger, 1990).

Some aspects of the first crite
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rion may be difficult to determine due to the accessi

bility of mental contents, such as specific memories or
interpretations of particular behaviors (Nisbett &
Ross, 1980).

Freud's (1915/1957) definition of repres

sion that it required an effort not to know seems

particularly apt in this case.

Emotions are, by defi

nition, psychophysiological responses that are diffi

cult to ignore.

Very young children, who have not yet

developed inhibitory controls, have no trouble express
ing the fact that they are upset despite difficulties
articulating why.

Therefore, if an affective state is

unconscious, it is reasonable to conclude that it is

not because we lack the capacity to know what we are

feeling.

With regard to the second criterion, psychoanalyt
ic theory states that information is not repressed
solely because it is unpleasant.

Reality testing

remains intact when an individual remembers they have
experienced a death of a family member, been divorced
or had an illness.

Within Gur and Sackeim's (1979)

framework, unconscious defenses entail active self-

deception in that one is motivated to keep something out
of the awareness because it is incompatible with a

conscious belief.

Freud (1915/1957) felt that a person

represses an idea when it is incompatible with her/his
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ego.

This formulation suggests that internal or exter

nal percepts become a target of defenses when they

directly or indirectly contradict strongly-held beliefs
about the self.

Experiences of discrepancies between

these ideals and perceptions of our actual behavior are

themselves major sources of negative affects (Higgins,
Klein & Strauman, 1985).

One strategy for reducing

this discomfort is to fail to recognize the discrepan
cies,

For example, if one's self-concept (i.e., the

"self-respect of the ego") incorporates an idealized

image the one is not prone to certain affects and

impulses, defensive maneuvers may be undertaken to
exclude them from awareness (A. Freud, 1966).

In order to distinguish the effects of true high
self-esteem from defensive high self-esteem in any pen

and-pencil measure of self-esteem or self-concept, a

reliable and valid procedure is necessary to identify
individuals prone to defensiveness.

This entails use

of an individual difference strategy because psycholo
gists have noted some individuals are very repressive
and others are not.

Since self-esteem assessments are

self-reports and subject to social desirability effects,
a serious confound occurs especially with subjects

reporting high SE.

For example, for those who report

low levels of negative affect, the SE scales have not
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distinguished between repressers (who maladaptively
self-deceive themselves avoiding perceptions or nega

tive affects) and truly low anxious individuals who are
well-adjusted and maintain non-defensive higher levels

of SE (Weinberger, 1990).

Thus, the relationship

between self-esteem and physical health should be

controlled for defensiveness partly because highly

defensive individuals who test high in self-esteem may
be unhealthy and have reported higher levels of physi
cal stress responses than low defensive individuals who
test high in self-esteem.
Summary

To investigate the relationship between global
self-esteem and physical health, the relationships
between an individual's affect, coping style or dispo
sition, and their physical health must be considered.

The dynamics of the relationship may be complex in
terms of describing the behavior of individuals with

varying levels of self-esteem.

For example, the indi

vidual with valid HSE has less frequent negative selfdescriptions, uses less self-devaluation, experiences
less negative affect, has a more authentic self, and
expresses less defensiveness than either a person with
defensive high self-esteem or one with low self-esteem.

This translates into a more congruent self with a less

34

disrupted identity in the face of stressful life events
because it allows the individual to feel that they can
deal more efficiently with, and better predict and
control, their social world.

Thus, an individual who

feels more positive about themselves and their ability

to predict and control their environment may experience
less stress and negative affect when they encounter
life events, and conseguently, better physical health
in terms of normal levels of such physiological indica
tors as systolic and dystolic blood pressure, choles

terol, thyroxine and leukocytes.
Physiological Measures
Blood Pressure.

Recent psychosomatic theories of coronary

heart disease (CHD) and essential hypertension (EH)
have described the role of cardiovascular reactivity.

Cardiovascular reactivity refers to changes in a varie
ty of physiological parameters, including systolic
blood pressure (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP)
in response to discrete environmental stimuli.

These

physiological responses are hypothesized to contribute
1

to the development of CHD (Clarkson, Manuck & Kaplan,
1986) and EH (Obrist, 1981).

Generally, these models

suggest that individuals with abnormal, frequent or
enduring cardiovascular responses to stressors are at
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greater risk for development of CHD or EH.
One important determinant of the degree of

cardiovascular reactivity elicited by stressors con
cerns the coping requirements of the situation.

His

torically, it has been assumed that control over events

reduces physiological arousal, but this is most likely
true only when the exertion of control is very easy
(Solomon, Holmes & McCaul, 1980).

Similar differences

are observed when active versus passive coping is

manipulated in the same task.

Whether performing

reaction-time tasks (Light & Obrist, 1983) or solving

cognitive problems (Smith, Houston & Stucky, 1983) in
an attempt to avoid electric shock, or in attempting to
influence other people (Smith, Allred, Morrison &

Carlson, 1989), greater levels of SBP, heart rate, and
sometimes DBP occur than by passively coping with the
stimuli.

Additionally, increased cardiovascular arous

al has been observed when subjects are anticipating

exerting effort in an active coping situation (Contra
da, Wright & Glass, 1984).

Easy coping tasks produce

lower levels of reactivity than do difficult tasks
(Solomon, Holmes, & McCaul, 1980).

Siltanen (1984) attempted to address these

concerns with a 10-year longitudinal study regarding
psychosomatic factors in CHD.
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Subjects were medically

and psychologically examined in 1966, 1971 and 1976.

Subjects were initially divided into three groups: a)
completely healthy, b) ECG signs, but no CHD signs, and
3) symptomatic CHD patients.

Subjects were age-matched

with no significant differences in occupation or stand

ard somatic risk factors.

The findings were in large

agreement with results of earlier studies (Zyzanski,
Jenkins, Ryan, Flessas and Everist, 1976) that obtained

a positive correlation between angiographically docu
mented coronary artery sclerosis and anxiety and de

pression measured independently from clinical manifes
tations of CHD.

One Study (Karteroliotis and Gill, 1987)

tested undergraduate males for cognitive worry, somatic

anxiety, self-confidence, heart rate and blood pres
sure.

Their results supported the relationship between

increased anxiety and cognitive worry and increased
levels of heart rate and blood pressure.
Since HSE individuals are less vulnerable to

stress and less subject to the effects of negative

affect, depression and anxiety, it was expected that
HSE subjects would test lower in SBP and DBF than sub

jects who have LSE.

These findings were expected to be

moderated by defensiveness and were expected for HSE

subjects who are not highly defensive.
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Cholesterol.

Although it has a negative connotation,
cholesterol is indispensable for body maintenance.

Its

main function is to contribute to the build-up of cell
membranes, but it is also a basic substance for the

production of bile acids in the liver and gonadal
hormones.

The body produces 80 to 90 percent of the

body's cholesterol.
foods.

The rest comes from ingested

There are two kinds of cholesterol known as

lipoproteins.

High-density lipoprotein (HDL) is bene

ficial serving to keep arteries clean and elastic.
Low-density lipoprotein (LDL) is associated with coro
nary heart attacks because it embeds itself in the

arterial walls, beginning to narrow and harden the
artery so that blood can only pass through with great
effort for the heart and much higher pressure in the

arteries (Rice, 1987).

For the purposes of this paper,

the term cholesterol is meant to describe the harmful
LDL cholesterol.

The contribution of diet to cholesterol was

investigated by Connor and Conner (1977).

After a

period of a cholesterol-free diet, 25 subjects were
given twice the average daily amount of cholesterol
(1000 mg.).

Still, the increase of cholesterol was

relatively small (from 210 to 245 mg. percent (mglOO
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ml), noarmal values ranging from 150 to 270 mg%).

A

feedback system in the body inhibits the endogenous
cholesterol production when nutrition uptake is in
creased.

Hence, nutrition can, indeed, increase cho

lesterol level, but its effects should not be overesti

mated (Rice, 1987).

Independent of any controversy concerning the
nutritional contributions of cholesterol, the status of

cholesterol as a risk factor is beyond dispute.

In the

study by Kannel, Castelli, Gordon and McNamara (1971),

its relation to CHD applied to both sexes and was

strongest in the 30-49 year age group.

The relation

between one's cholesterol level and risk seems to be

continuous since there is no "critical level" found to
discriminate between risk and no-risk individuals.

The

CHD risk of subjects in the upper 20 percent of the
distribution of cholesterol values was 2.4 times that

of subjects in the lowest 20 percent.
Increases in cholesterol levels have been

found with changes in mood.

Psychological stress

originates from a subjective appraisal of the total
situation and can lead to emotions such as fear and
depression.

Different studies have evaluated the

relationship between changes in mood, psychological
stress and its effect on cholesterol levels.
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In one study involving frogmen, Rahe, et al.
(1968) found a rise in cholesterol during periods when
anxiety and discomfort were reported.

Subjects moods

and cholesterol levels were tested periodically over a
two-month period.

Results indicated positive correla

tions of cholesterol with depression, fear and anger,
and negative correlations with motivation, happiness
and arousal.

The strongest correlation was between

depression and cholesterol in five of the 16 sessions
tested (Rahe, et al., 1971).

In another study, unem

ployed men were evaluated by nurses for anxiety, sad
ness and self-esteem.

Those subjects judged depressed

invariably manifested elevated cholesterol levels
(Kasl, Cobb & Brooks, 1968).

Segers and Mertens (1976) explored the cho

lesterol-psychological relationship in two age groups
(above and below 45 years of age) which were further

subgrouped according to weight (underweight, normal,
obese).

Significant findings occurred between both

depression and anxiety and cholesterol in the young
obese group because of the influence of mood on eating
behaviors.

The observation was made that under stress

ful conditions, individuals with generally high choles
terol levels reacted by increasing food consumption,
whereas those with normal cholesterol levels tended to
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respond with a decrease in appetite.

In a study by Jenkins, James and Zyzanski
(1969) exploring the relationship between cholesterol
and 18 scales of the the California Personality Inven

tory, two main dimensions were associated with high
cholesterol:

overactivity (competition, aggression and

impatience) and overcontrol (responsibility, conform

ism, and low self-esteem).

van Boornen and Orlebeke

(1982) investigated relationships between personality
variables, general cholesterol levels, and cholesterol
response to stressors.

Personality variables measured

were depression, neuroticism, debilitating anxiety and
achievement motivation.

In contrast to other findings,

the only significant correlations occurred with
achievement motivation and a stress-induced cholesterol

rise and this was predominately attributed to male

subjects.
Since HSE individuals are less vulnerable to

stress, and less subject to the effects of negative
affect and depression, it was expected that HSE sub

jects have lower cholesterol levels than than subjects
who have LSE.

These findings were expected to be moder

ated by defensiveness and were expected for HSE sub
jects who are not highly defensive.
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Thyroxine.

Zack and Ackerman (1988) offered three models

of thyroid function, metabolic regulation and depres
sion:

a) Model 1; Depressive symptoms are primary,

changes in thyroid function and metabolic rate are
secondary, b) Model 2: Change in metabolic rate is

primary, changes in thyroid function and depressive
symptoms are secondary, and c) Model 3: Thyroid changes

are primary, changes in energy balance and depressive
symptoms are secondary because there has been no theory

to explain why weight loss occurs in some depressions
and weight gain in others.

These models are said to

represent different pathophysiologic states which are

equally likely to occur, and Zack and Ackerman suggest
ed further research to test these models.

The hypothalamic-pituitary-thyroid axis

effect on mood has been a subject of research since

both increases and decreases of thyroid indices have

been linked with mood disorders.

Depressed patients

have been found to have blunted thyroid-stimulating
hormone (TSH) responses to thyrotropin-releasing hor

mone (TRH) in comparison to patients with other psychi
atric illnesses and normal controls (Extein, Pottash &
Gold, 1981; Kirkegaard, Bjorum, Cogn & Lauridsen,
1978).

The proportion of depressed patients with a
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blunted TSH response to TRH has been found to vary from

25% to 70% across different studies (Loosen & Prange,
1982).

More recently, the TKH-test has been suggested

as a diagnostic aid in major depressive disorders
(Extein, et al., 1981; Targum, Sullivan, & Byrnes,
1982).

The significance of the blunted TSH response
to TRH in depressives is unclear.

Hatotani, Nomura,

Yamaguchi and Kitayam (1970) suggest that it may be due
to reduced thyroid function; whereas. Loosen and Prange
(1982) state that during depression there is hyperse

cretion of TRH with a transient increase in thyroid
activity, producing blunting by negative feedback.

However, longitudinal studies, and those assessing

thyroid function during depressive episodes and again
after recovery, suggest that thyroid levels are high

during depression and fall on recovery (Board, Wadeson,
& Persky, 1957; Kirkegaard & Faber, 1981).
Raised cortisol levels may also cause blunt
ing of the TSH response (Loosen, Prange & Wilson,
1978).

A study by Agren and Wide (1982) reported an

inverse relationship between TSH response and cortisol
levels, but this association was not confirmed by Gold,
Pottash, Ryan, Sweeney, Davies and Martin (1980) and
Davis, et al. (1981).

Galloway, Dolan, Fonagy, De
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Souza, and Wakeling (1984) suggest that more than one

mechanism may be responsible for the blunted TSH re
sponse in depressed patients> such as weight loss,
reduced intake, or other metabolic factors.
Munjack and Palmer (1988) tested 52 adult

patients diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder
for more than 6 months, 41 adult patients with either

panic disorder or panic disorder with agoraphobia, and
14 controls who had been screened for thyroid disease

and found no significant differences in thyroid func

tion between groups.

However, Argue, Segura and Torru

bia (1987) found a positive relationship between de
pression and anxiety and thyroxine, and a negative

relationship between hypomania and thyroxine when
comparing 44 psychosomatic and 13 healthy subjects.
Brayshaw and Brayshaw (1986) found 51 of 54 women with

premenstrual syndrome (PMS) showed evidence of thyroid

misfunction and 34 women found relief when a synthetic
thyroxine supplement was administered.

As stated

earlier, thyroxine levels are affected by mood and
stress but studies have indicated bi-directional re
sults.

Since HSE individuals are less vulnerable to

stress and less subject to the effects of negative
affect, depression and anxiety, it was expected that
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HSE subjects have lower thyroxine levels compared to
LSE subjects.

These findings werre expected to be

moderated by defensiveness and were expected for HSE
subjects who are not highly defensive.
Leukocytes.

Stressful events have been known to have

adverse effects on health, and the immune system is

thought to be an important mediator between aversive
events and infectious disease (Ader, 1981; Borysenko,
1984).

There is substantial evidence that natural

killer (NK) cell activity has an important role in the
body's defense against illnesses (Herberman, 1982).

Interferon is a major regulator of NK cell activity,
because it can affect both the growth and differentia

tion of NK cells from their progenitor cells.
Glaser, Rice, Speicher, Stout, and Kiecolt-

Glaser (1986) addressed the effects of commonplace
stress on interferon production and NK cell activity
and numbers by testing 40 medical students before and

after examinations and found the IFN levels produced by

peripheral blood leukocytes were significantly lower
after stress, and the NK cell activity was also signif
icantly lower than baseline, having controlled for poor
nutrition.

Other studies (Glaser, Kiecolt-Glaser,

Speicher & Holliday, 1985; Glaser, Kiecolt-Glaser,
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stout, et al., 1985) support the reliability and perva
siveness of the iinmunodepressive effects of acute
stress on the immune system again controlling for
variations of sleep and nutrition.

Glaser, et al.

(1985) state "longer-term stress-related alterations in
cellular immunity may carry an increased risk for

immunodeficiency disorders and malignant and infectious
disease" (p. 678).
Earlier studies with rodents suggested that
stress-related changes in IFN production were found in

virus-infected mice following application of shock
(Chang & Rasmussen, 1965) and restraint (Steplweski &
Vogel, 1986).

For example, after 11 days of restraint

stress, the mice's leukocytes count fell about 50% and

after a 12 day recovery period, normal leukocyte was
restored (Steplweski & Vogel, 1986).
Since HSE individuals are less vulnerable to

stress and less subject to the effects of negative
affect, depression and anxiety, it was expected that

HSE subjects have higher leukocyte levels than subjects
with LSE.

These effects were expected to be moderated

by defensiveness and were expected for HSE subjects who
are not highly defensive.
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PILOT STUDY

Introduction

The data for the main study were obtained from

medical records provided by the Yale Behavioral Medi
cine Clinic, an outpatient service that evaluates and
treats mostly stress-related disorders. Since no direct

measure of self-esteem was included in the test battery
used by the Yale Behavioral Medical Clinic, a Self-

Esteem Questionnaire was developed using specific items
from measures available, such as the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI), Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS),
SCL-90-R Questionnaire that on face value measured

dimensions of self-esteem.

In order to verify that the

proposed Self-Esteem Questionnaire was measuring self-

esteem, a pilot Study was developed to select items
from the above cited available measures for the ques
tionnaire.
Method

Subjects

Twenty university college students who were taking
psychology classes volunteered for this portion of the
research.
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Self-Esteem Questionnaire Development

From the available personality measures in the
above cited test battery (e.g., BDI, TMAS, and SCL-90

R), 38 items were selected on face value that appeared

to measure self-esteem (i.e., "I am happy most of the
time").
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965) was includ

ed in the pilot instrumeht in orderselect items and to
assess the construct validity of the proposed Self-

Esteern Questionnaire using item analysis.

A copy of

the Self-Esteem Questionnaire (Pilot Study) is listed

as Appendix A.
Rosenberg's (1962a) Self-Esteem Scale was de

veloped to measure the self-acceptance aspects of selfesteem.

The scale was originally designed for use with

high school students.

Norms were developed by randomly

selecting 10 high schools in New York testing 5,024
students.

The scale consists of 10-items, and accord

ing to Rosenberg (1965) it is valid to score it as a
simple additive scale.

The Self-Esteem Scale was designed to be a unidi

mensional measure specifically with brevity and ease of
administration.

High self-esteem indicates respect for

oneself and a feeling of self-worth, but not feeling
superior to others; whereas, low self-esteem indicates
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both a lack of self-respect and feelings of inadequacy.
Silber and Tippett (1965) found the Guttman scale repro

ducibility coefficient as .92 with Coopersmith SelfEsteem Inventory a correlation of .59 indicating the
items have a high internal and construct reliability.
Test-retest correlation over two weeks was .85.

Evi

dence of the construct validity appears in a high
correlation between the Self-Esteem Scale and a scale

of depressive affect (Rosenberg, 1962a) and a measure-

of psychophysiological indicators of anxiety (Rosen
berg, 1962b).

The scale is criticized by Nunnally (1967) who
states that the small number of items and forced rec

tangular distribution of items in Guttman scales are
artificial and likely to produce gross ordinal distri
butions between people.
cism, this scale

Notwithstanding this criti

has become widely used as a quick

assessment of self-esteem.

The Symptom Check List-90-Revised (SCL-R-90) is a

90-item, self-report inventory designed to assess

psychological symptoms of medical and psychiatric

patients.

The inventory measures somatization, obses

sive-compulsive symptoms, interpersonal sensitivity,
depression, anxiety, phobic anxiety, psychoticism,
paranoid ideation, hostility and global indices of
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psychopathology originally developed by the Clinical

Psychoraetrics Research Unit of Johns Mopkins Universi
ty.

All items have a 5-point response scale (Derogatis

& Melisaratos, 1983).

Although this is a very brief scale by comparison
with

the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory

(MMPI), and some factors are measured by as few as 6

items, its reliability is remarkably high.

Measures of

factor internal consistency range from .77 (psychoti

cism) to .90 (depression), and test-retest (1 week
apart) correlation coefficients range from .78 (hostil

ity) to .90 (phobic anxiety) in a psychiatric popula
tion (Derogatis, Rickels & Rock, 1976).

The most impressive set of research studies is
concerned with the use of the SCL-90-R in depression.
Several investigators have reported significant corre

lations between the SCIj-90-R symptom subscale scores
and measures of analogous constructs and similar dimen
sions measured by the MMPI (Derogatis, Rickels & Rock,

1976; Dinning & Evans, 1977).

Further, Derogatis and

Cleary (1977) describe results of a confirmatory factor

analysis on data from 1,000 psychiatric outpatients.
They interpreted their findings to show a reasonably
good match between empirical findings and the hypothe
sized symptom structure in eight of the nine areas
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measured by the test.

Generally positive confirmatory

factor analyses have also been reported in studies of
neurotic patients (Jerabek, Klimpl & Boleloucky, 1982).
The SCL-90-R is a widely used self-report measure of

psychopathology with sound psychometric properties,
including high levels of internal consistency and

temporal stability.

The weaknesses of the SCL-90-R are

similar to those of many self-report instruments;

1)

there is an assumption that the research subject will
accurately describe symptoms and behavior (Derogatis &
Melisaratos, 1983; Wilde, 1972), 2) that response bias
or social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) do not

contribute to scores in a systematic fashion, and 3)

that there is an equivocal concordance between patient
reports and clinical ratings.
For the purpose of this study, fourteen items from

the SCL-R-90 were selected which appeared to measure
aspects of negative self-concept, depression or anxie

ty.

Examples of some items are "Feeling that people

are unfriendly or dislike you," or "Feeling inferior to
others."

The complete list of items is shown in Appen

dix A.

The Beck Depression Inventory was developed by
Beck (1967, 1970).

He was one of the first psycholo

gists to offer a cognitive theory of depression because
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he had observed that depressed people had a negative

view of themselves, were pessimistic about the future
and had a tendency to interpret ongoing events in a
negative manner.

In 1970, Beck developed the Beck

Depression Inventory (BDI) which measures the presence

and degree of depression in adolescents and adults and

has been widely accepted in psychology as a simple and
quick tool in assessing the presence and depth of
depression.

One study demonstrated a correlation

of .77 between the BDI and psychiatric rating using
university students as subjects (Bumberry, Oliver, &

McClure, 1978).

Other measures of validity have been

undertaken by comparing the results of the BDI with
other measures of depression, such as

the Depression

Adjective Checklist and the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI) (Reynolds, et al., 1981).
Each item of the BDI corresponds to a specific
category of depressive symptom and/or attitude.

Each

category was designed to describe a specific behavioral
manifestation of depression.

Of the 21 items, only

nine items were hypothesized to measure aspects of
self-esteem, for example;

sadness (negative affect);

pessimism (stability); sense of failure (self-confi
dence); dissatisfaction (self-image); and self-dislike
(self-esteem).

Each item consists of a graded series
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of four self-evaluative statements that are rank or

dered and weighted according to the severity of the

symptom from neutral to maximiom severity.

For example,

sense of failure (self-confidence) consists of the

following range of severity from "I feel I am a com

plete failure as a person (parent, husband, wife)" to
"I do not feel like a failure."

A complete list of the

selected BDI items are listed in Appendix A, SelfEsteem Questionnaire - Pilot Study.
The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor, 1951)
was developed for use in a study of eyelid conditioning

by taking items from the MMPI which allegedly described
anxiety reactions.

The scale went through several

modifications and presently consists of 50 items now
known as the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor,
1953).

The test norms were developed with various

groups such as university students in Iowa, airmen

tested at the beginning of their basic |:raining at an
Air Force Base, and university students at Northwestern

in a repeated measures design.

The test-retest coeffi

cient was found to be .89 after 3 weeks (n=163), .82
over 5 months (n=113), and .81 after 9-17 months

(n=50).

Additionally no appreciable sex differences,

no practice effects, and no differences in scores
attributable to variations in filler items were noted
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(Holtzman, Calvin & Bitterroan, 1952).

Fifteen items were taken from the Taylor Manifest

Anxiety Scale and used in the Self-Esteem Question
naire.

For example, one item is "I am certainly lack

ing in self-confidence."

A complete list can be re

viewed in Appendix A.
Results

In order to develop a Self-Esteem scale and esti
mate the construct validity of the new Self-Esteem

Questionnaire, only 15 items that comprised the highest

correlation (r>.43) with the summated Rosenberg SelfEsteem Scale were used.
and final items.
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See Table 1 for the results

TABLE 1.

Inter-Item Correlations between Rosenbei:q's
Self-Esteem Scale and Self-Esteem Items and Alpha
Levels.
Corrected
Self-Esteem

Item -

Rosenberg SE

Questionnaire

Correlation

Items

.486
.539
.577
.574

B7

T5
T7
T12
T13
SI
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S8
S12
S13
S14

Alpha
If Item
Deleted

.895
.884
.882
.883
.885
.884
.878
.883
.887
.873
.884
.878
.868
.872
.874

.470
.481
.629
.477

.466
.707
.456
.614
.804
.730
.682

Note. N = 20; B = Beck Depression Inventory;
T = Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale; S = Symptom Check
List-90-Revised.

The final version of the Self-Esteem Questionnaire
had an overall alpha Of .8997.

Split-half reliability

was .7821 for the first eight items, and .8612 for the
last seven items.

Of the original 15 SCL-R-90 items selected, only

10 had significant correlations with Rosenberg's SelfEsteem Scale.

An example of a significant SCL-R-90

item is "Feeling inferior to others."

Of the original

nine BDI items tested, only one had a significant
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correlation with Rosenberg's Self Esteem Scale.
item was "sense of failure (self-confidence).

That

From the

15 TMAS items chosen, only four had significant corre
lations with Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale.

An example

of such an item is "I feel I am no good at all."

In

order to differentiate high and low self esteem scores,

the median split of 9.0 was used.

See Table 2 for the

final version of the Self-Esteem Questionnaire.

TABLE 2.

Self-Esteem Questionnaire ^ Final Version.

Choice of one or more items.

1.

(Beck-Social Withdrawal)

a.

I have lot all of my interest in other people

b.
c.

I have lost more of my interest in other
people and have little feeling for them.
I am less interested in other people than I

d.

I have not lost interest in other people.

and don't care about them at all.

used to be.

True/False Choice.

2.

Life is a strain for me much of the time. (Taylor)

3.

I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces.
(Taylor)

4.

I am certainly lacking in self-confidence. (Taylor)

5.

I am happy most of the time. (Taylor)
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Choose Descriptors:

A. Not at all
B. A little bit

C. Moderately
D. Quite a bit
E. Extremely

6.

Feeling that others do not understand you or
are unsympathetic. (SCL-R-90)

7.

Feeling that people are unfriendly or dislike you.
{SCL-R-9G)

8.

Feeling inferior to others. (SCL-R-90)

9.

Feeling uneasy when people are watching or talking
about you. (SCL-R-90)

10.

Feeling very self-conscious with others.
(SCL-R-90)

11.

Feeling uncomfortable about eating or drinking
in public. (SCL-R-90)

12.

Difficulty making decisions. (SCL-R-90)

13.

Blaming yourself for things. (SCL-R-90)

14.

Feeling hopeless about the future. (SCL-R-90)

15.

Feeling of worthlessness. (SCL-R-90)
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PHYSIOLQGlCAIi STUDY

Method

SubiectB

The medical records of 183 patients (76 males/107
females) on whom complete computer data was available
were selected for the main study.

These subjects had

presented themselves during the period of 1981 to 1983
to the Yale Behavioral Medicine Clinic.

Sample means and standard deviations for the

subjects' age and weight are presented by gender in
Table 3.

TABLE 3.

Means and Standard Deviations of Subjects' Age and
Weight bv Gender.

GENDER

Men

Variable

n

Mean

Women

SD

Mean

n

SD

Age (Years)

76

38.19 14.30

107

. 40.57 15.26

Weight (lbs.)

76

180.97 38.86

107

142.78 36.11

The effects of gender were examined using multiple
regression.

Age was not significant, but weight was

found to be significant F(2)=24.302, p<.00.
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Addition

ally, when smoking habits was examined by gender, 48
(63.16%) of the men smoked, while 28 (36.84%) did not.
Of the 107 women, 70 (65,42%) smoked and 37 (34.58%)
did not.
Medical Tests

All patients who participated in this study at the
clinic received an initial psychological assessment and
routine blood and urine tests prior to being examined
by a physician.

The single blood sample was drawn

between 2:00 and 4:30 p.m. on the day of the psycholog

ical assessment and was analyzed by the Yale - New

Haven Hospital, Clinical Hematology Laboratory for the

cholesterol, white blood count (leukocyte), and thyrox
ine evaluation.

CBC differentials were derived using

manual inspection and counting techniques by trained
laboratory personnel.

Blood pressure was measured by

the examining physician using a sphygmomanometer, an

instrument consisting of an inflatable cuff placed
around the upper left arm, and a stethoscope.

Medical

histories, including self-reports of current medica
tions and smoking habits, were also obtained from all

patients.
Psychological Tests

Behavioral Medicine Clinic psychological staff
administered a battery of psychological tests immedi
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ately following the medical testing.

The psychological

tests that pertain to this study included the Beck
Depression Inventory (EDI), Taylor Manifest Anxiety
Scale (TMAS), SCL-90-R Questionnaire, and Marlowe-

Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS).
Defensiveness was controlled by the use of the

Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale.

In 1960,

Crowne and Marlowe developed the MCSDS to discriminate
defensive versus non-defensive individuals reporting
low distress.

By 1964, Crowne and Marlowe realized

that their scale was primarily measuring a substantive

individual difference dimension rather than response
bias which has been confirmed by a formidable body of
research (Arkin & Lake, 1983; Nordholm, 1974; McCrae &
Costa, 1983; Wiesenthal, 1974).
Current evidence is most consistent with the

interpretation that high scorers on the MCSDS generally

believe what they are reporting and attempt to behave
accordingly.

Close friends of high scores confirmed

that these subjects actually try to conform to the
rigid standards of self-control outlined in the test
(Strahan & Strahan, 1972).
For low-scorers on the Marlowe-Crowne (1960,

1964), "socially desirable" responses may be agreeing

that certain perceived universals about human nature
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also apply to them.

However, they simply consider it

untenable to deny statements such as "I sometimes feel
resentful when I don't get my way."

It is common

knowledge that individuals who make implausible claims
are often suspected of lying, and blatant lying is not
considered "socially desirable."

Whereas, high scorers

must believe they are at least capable of extraordinary
self-control reflected in those items.

Otherwise, they

too would consider it untenable to make such claims
(Kraut, 1978).

Since Crowne and Marlowe (1960) used the normed
mean score of 13.72 and Standard deviation of 5.78 to

differentiate low and high defensiveness groups, this
same mean and standard deviation was used to divide our

subjects into similar groups.

Sample means and stand

ard deviations for the subjects' defensiveness are

presented by gender in Table 4.
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TABLE 4.

Means and Standard Deviations of Subjects'
Defensiveness bv Gender.

GENDER

Men

Variable

Defensiveness

n

76

Women

Mean

SD

15.76

6.03

n

107

Mean

SD

16.88

6.38

Note. According to Cfowne & Marlowe (1960), the normed
mean for the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
is 13.72 with a standard deviation of 5.78.

Defensiveness was not found significant when exam
ining the effects of gender in a multiple regression
equation.
An example of an MCSDS item is "I never hesitate
to go out of my way to help someone in trouble."

A

complete version of the MCSDS scale is shown in Appen
dix B.
Results

Self-esteem and defensiveness served as independ

ent variables, while the physiological measures (blood
pressure, cholesterol, thyroxine and luekocytes) were

dependant variables.

Sex, age, weight and smoking

habits were used as control variables.

Prior to analysis, self-esteem, defensiveness,
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sex, age, weight, smoke, cholesterol, thyroxine, lym
phocytes, systolic and diastolic blood pressure were
examined through Systat programs for accuracy of data
entry, missing values, and fit between their distribu

tions and the assumptions of multivariate analysis.
Cases with missing values in self-esteem, defensive

ness, sex, age, weight and smoke were deleted, leaving
183 cases for analysis.
Self-Esteem

The means and standard deviations of self-esteem

and defensiveness for high and low self-esteem and
defensiveness groups by gender are presented in Table
5. in order to determine if the distributions of defen
siveness and self-esteem were similar for men and
women.
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TABLE 5.

Means and Standard Deviations of Self-Esteem

and Defensiveness bv High and Low Self-Esteem^ and
Defensiveness" Groups bv Gender.

GROUPS

Gender

HSE/LDef

HSE/HDef

LSE/LDef

LSE/HDef

Males (n=76)
n

15

Mean SE
SD
Mean Def
SD

4.13
3.16
10.33
3.50

19

17

25

3.84
2.73
20.21
3.47

22.94
6.66
9.64
3.16

23.08
9.71
19.84
3.61

25
4.40
3.76
20.16
4.19

13
23.54
7.53
10.92
3.57

41
23.63
8.06
21.10
4.74

Females (n=107)
n
Mean SE
SD
Mean Def
SD

28
3.21
2.88
10.54
3.05

Note. ^Self-esteem groups were split using the
median score of 9.00. ®Defensiveness groups were split
according to Crowne and Marlowe's (1960) normed mean
of 13.72.

Further, the correlations between self-esteem and

defensiveness for men r=-.060 and women r=.191 indicat

ed no relationship between the two variables.
These tables indicate that the method used to

split the groups resulted in clear demarcations.
Systolic Blood Pressure.

The means for systolic blood pressure for

self-esteem and defensiveness are depicted on Table 6.
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TABLE 6.

Mean Systolic Blood Pressure Levels bv Self-Esteem
and De£ensiveness.

SELF-ESTEEM

High
DEFENSIVENESS

n

Mean

Low
SD

n

Mean

SD

Low

32

132.81

16.80

18

143.72

17.68

High

20

135.00

18.03

40

139.20

23.82

Note. n=110. Overall mean was 135.84, SD 19.90.

The above table of means without controls

suggests that self-esteem controlled by defensiveness

did influence systolic blood pressure.

However, using

multiple regression, neither self-esteem, defensiveness
or the interaction between self-esteem and defensive

ness was found significant.

When the control variables

(sex, age, weight and smoke) were added to the multiple
regression, the effects of self-esteem, defensiveness
and the interaction still were not significant, al
though both age and weight were individually signifi

cant, Multiple r=.625, F(7)=9.318, p<.00.
Diastolic Blood Pressure.

As a test for multicollinearity of the data,
a pairwise correlation matrix was examined.
7 for the results.
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See Table

TABLE 7.

Pearson Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Diastolic
Blood Pressure.

Dias.

Self-

BP

Esteem Def.

Age

Weight Smoke

Diastolic Blood
Pressure
Self-Esteem

1.000
0.039

1.000

Defensiveness 0.146

0.087

1.000

Age

0.301

0.159

0.158

1.000

Weight

0.415 -0.030

0.044

0.148

0.027

0.033 -0.102

Smoke

-0.169

0.148

1.000
1.000

Note. n=110. All other variables had n=183.

Examination of the pairwise correlations did
not indicate multicollinearity of the data.
The means of diastolic blood pressures for
self-esteem and defensiveness are depicted in Table 8.

66

TABLE 8.

Mean Diastolic Blood Pressure Levels bv Self-Esteem
and Defensiveness.

SELF-ESTEEM

High
DEFENSIVENESS

n

Low
SD

Mean

h

Mean

SD

Low

32

86.28

10.73

i8

84.00

13.05

High

20

87.55

12.24 ~

40

89.05

13.14

Note. n=110. Overall mean was 87.14, SD 12.26.

Inspection of the table of means without use
of controls suggests that the effects of defensiveness
appear to depend on self-esteem rather than the re

verse.

Among the LSE subjects, a greater difference in

diastolic blood pressure as a function of defensiveness
was found than with high self-esteem groups.

Using muliple regression, when self-esteem,
defensiveness and their interaction was tested, the
interaction between self-esteem and defensiveness

indicated a trend, t(3)=1.88, ^<-063, Multiple r=.230,
r =.053.

When the control variables, weight and sex,

were added to the regression, the interaction of selfesteem and defensiveness was significant, t,(5)=2.04,

£<.04, Multiple r=.468,

=.219.

However, the highest

predictability (rf.=.280, r =.529) for diastolic blood
pressure occurred when self-esteem, defensiveness.
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their interaction, and the Gontrol variables of weight,
age and smoke were combined.

In this equation, only

weight and age were significant £<.01.
In an attempt to further analyze the signifi
cant effects of interaction between self-esteem and

defensiveness on diastolic blood pressure, this same

group of variables was analyzed using stepwise regres
sion with and without the inclusion of the interaction

between self-esteem and defensiveness.

The interaction

did not contribute to the equation.
Since Systat did not have a hierarchical

regression model, a regression analysis of diastolic
blood pressure with and without the interaction of

self-esteem and defensiveness was performed including
various combinations of the control variables of

weight, age, and smoke in order to interpret the re
sults of the interaction.
sults.
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Table ? presents the re

TABLE 9.

Summary of Hierarchical Analysis for Interaction
between Self-Esteem and Defehsiveness for Diastolic
Blood Pressure.

No Interaction

Control

P

Residual

R^

interaction

Control

P

Residual

R^

Weight

.000 13570.11 .172

Weight

.177
.000 13339.74 .186

SE/Def

.411

Weight

.000
.002 12421.35 .242

Weight

.000

Age

.004 12342.03 .247

SE/Def

Weight

Smoke

.000
.181 13343.88 .186

Smoke

.099
.000
.101 13003.26 .207

Age

.001 14907.87 .091

SE/Def
Age

.441
.003 14824.91 .096

Age
Smoke

.001
.048 14371.32 .123

Smoke

Smoke

.077 15925.50 .029

Smoke

SE/Def

Age

weight

SE/Def
Age

SE/Def

SE/Def

Age

Weight
Smoke

.004
.000
.094 12052.73 .265

Age

Weight
Smoke

.240
.002
.031 14184.50 .135

.087
.038 15492.50 .055
.151
.007
.000
.145 11812.69 .280

Note, n = 110, 73 cases deleted due to missing data.

With every combination of the independent varia
bles, note the change in R
action.

with and without the inter

In each case, the inclusion of the interaction
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between self-esteem and defensiveness slightly reduced

the residual term and inereased the squared multiple R,
thereby mimimally increasing the predictability of the
effects on diastolic blood pressure.

Therefore, the

interaction of self-esteem and defensiveness contribut

ed minimally or not at all depending on the regression
method used.
Cholesterol.

The means of cholesterol for self-esteem and

defensiveness is depicted on Table 10.

TABLE 10.

Mean Cholesterol Levels bv Self-Esteem and

Defensiveness.

SELF-ESTEEM

High
DEFENSIVENESS

Low

n

Mean

Low
SD

n

Mean

SD

34

201.73

41.19

24

200.42

50.94

37

209.54

33,29

57

216.77

49.85

Note. n=152. Overall mean was 209.07, SD 44.70.

Using multiple regression, there was no sig
nificant effect of either self-esteem or defensiveness
on cholesterol with or without the interaction of selfesteem and defensiveness.

When the control variables

(sex, age, etc.) were added to the multiple regression.
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neither self-esteem, defensiveness or their interaction

were significant, although both age and weight were

significant with and without the interaction, ^<'00 and
n<.05, respectively.
Thyroxine.

The means of thyroxine for self-esteem and

defensiveness is depicted on Table 11.

TABLE 11.

Mean Thyroxine Levels by Self-Esteem and Defensiveness.

SELF-ESTEEM

High

Low

n

Mean

SD

Low

36

7.01

High

38

7.51

DEFENSIVENESS

Note. n=158.

n

Mean

SD

1.54

26

7.13

1.59

1.95
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7.83

2.06

Overall mean was 7.45, SD 1.87.

There was no significant effect of selfesteem on thyroxine with or with the interaction of
self-esteem and defensivness.

Defensiveness was found to have an overall

significant effect on thyroxine only when no interac
tion of self-esteem and defensiveness was included in

the equation.

Defensiveness remained a significant

effect when the controls were added individually or in

combination.

High defensive subjects had significantly
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higher levels of thyroxine than low defensive subjects.
When the interaction for self-esteem and defensiveness

was included in the multiple regression, the effects of
defensiveness were no longer significant with or with
out the controls.
Leukocytes.

The means of leukocyte levels for self-esteem

and defensiveness is depicted on Table 12.
TABLE 12.

Mean Leukocyte Levels Bv Self-Esteem and Defensiveness.

SELF-ESTEEM

High
DEFENSIVENESS

n

Mean

Low

35

28.12

High

35

26.98

Note. n=147.

Overall mean

Low
SD

n

Mean

SD

7.71

24

25.90

8.64

9.25
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28.21

9.49

was 27.52, SD 8.85.

Review of the above means indicate that

neither self-esteem or defensiveness without the con

trol variables had an effect on leukocyte scores.

Using multiple regression, there was no significant
effect of either self-esteem, defensiveness or their

interaction on leukocyte levels.
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DISCUSSION

Of all the physiological icieasures used in this
study, only diastolic blood pressure produced signifi
cant results involving self-esteem and that was in the

interaction between self-esteem and defensiveness.

The

mimimal effect of the interaction on diastolic blood

pressure occurred when the control variables were
included individually or in combination.

The effect of

the interaction between self-esteem and defensiveness

on diastolic blood pressure with the control variables
was not present in all combinations.

When this inter

action effect occurred, it appeared in unexpected
places.
Examination of the interaction of self-esteem and

defensiveness using different regression methods sug

gest that its effect is mimimal, at best.

As might be

expected, weight and age were the significant independ

ent predictors of diastolic blood pressure.
Since blood pressure was assessed only once at the
beginning of the study, this method may be flawed.
Seer (1979) pointed out that BP changes considerably,
both with time of day (Agras, et al., 1980) and in
response to various environmental and behavioral fac
tors (Harshfield, Pickering, Kleiner, Blank & Laragh,

1982).

Thus, health-care professionals have been con
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cerned about the representativeness of BP readings and
the adequacy of decisions based on those measures.

Since the subjects were attending the Yale Behav
ioral Medicine Clinic for stress-related disorders, it
seems reasonable to assurae that these subjects were

experiencing stress in their lives.

Could it be that

these results were obtained because the subjects were

tested during an identity disruption crisis brought on
by their stress, mood state or coping style before they
had had an opportunity to readjust their self-esteem or

change their coping style?

Hence, blood pressure or

other physiological measures may have been atypical at
the time.

That may account for the lack of main ef

fects for self-esteem and defensiveness for the physio

logical health measures, and the reason age, weight and
smoking habits were more predictive since each of the
control variables may be more sensitive to changes in
stress than personality measures.

Regarding thyroxine, self-esteem was not signifi
cant in any condition.

Defensiveness taken from the

MCSDS was the best predictive variable followed by sex,
but only when the interaction between self-esteem and
defensiveness was omitted.

These results are difficult

to interpret because thyroxine levels are known to be
affected by mood and stress, and studies have indicated
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bi-directional results.

If future research is planned,

the effects of sex may further differentiate the ef
fects of defensiveness and perhaps self-esteem on

thyroxine levels, as well as other physiological meas
ures.

Age and weight were significant predictors of both
systolic blood pressure and cholesterol levels, while
self-esteem or defensiveness were not.

However, nei

ther self-esteem, defensiveness, their interaction or

the control variables were predictive measures of
leukocyte levels.

The source for the Self-Esteem Questionnaire in

this Study were items taken from the Taylor Manifest
Anxiety Scale, Beck Depression Scale and SCL-R-90 that
were assumed to measure self-esteem.

In many cases,

the items addressed issues of negative self-esteem
(e.g. "I am certainly lacking in self-confidence") and

perhaps subsequent negative affect since only one of

the items was positively worded.

The resulting data

may have been tainted by the subjects' mood state when
the self-report was taken, thereby confounding the
results.

Since negative self-esteem and affect have been

shown to affect physical health by mediating the ef
fects of stress, one would have expected significant
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relationships between the physical health measures and
self-esteem.

However, the negative affect itself may

have biased the self-esteem measure.
The results of this research seem consistent with

studies by McCrae, et al. (1976) and Tessler and Me

chanic (1978) who found an intriguing pattern.

Nega

tive affect correlated significantly with self-rated
physical health, self-rated physical health was signif

icantly related to physicians rating, but negative
affect was not related to objectivly obtained measures,
such as blood pressure scores and cholesterol levels.
Watson and Pennebacker (1989) noted a linear and con

tinuous relationship between NA scores and somatic

complaining.

At any level of NA, the higher the NA

score, the more increasing the symptoms (Costa &
McCrae, 1985).

Watson and Pennebaker (1989) found that

despite their iiyriad of physical complaint, high NA
individuals showed no increased frequency of physician
or health-center visits.

Watson and Pennebaker (1989) offered the following
explanations for their results;

High NA individuals

are more sensitive to pain and/or are hypervigilant and

scan their environment for impending trouble.

In

assessing sensitivity to pain, these authors found the

literature inconsistent and difficult to intepret.
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Although negative affect has been found related to an

individual's report of pain, other investigators have
reported that negative affect is generally unrelated to
pain threshold and tolerance measures.

Because the

literative in this area is inconsistent, interpretation
of these results based on the subjects' negative affect

filtered through self-reports would be foolhardy since
additional factors must be involved as well.

Watson and Pennebaker (1989) felt that hypervigi

lance increased somatic complaining in two ways:
First, high NA's may be more likely to notice or attend
to normal body sensation or minor aches and pains.
Second, because their scanning is highly related with

anxiety and uncertainty, high NA individuals may inter
pret normal symptoms as painful or pathological.
Indeed, Watson and Pennebaker note several studies have

shown that high NA subject interpret ambiguous stimuli
in a negative or threatening manner (Goodstein, 1954;
Watson & Clark, 1984) suggesting that high NA subjects

report more physical problems simply because they are

more internally focused.

Pennebaker and Lightner

(1980) support the idea that internal orientation

increases physical symptom reporting.
In their 1989 study, Watson and Pennebaker con
cluded that although NA is associated with a number of
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subjective complaints and is highly correlated with
physical symptom measures, NA is more a general trait
of somatopsychic distress which is self-reported dis

tress that is expressed through a broad range of nega
tive affective states and somatic complaints.

As such,

NA acts as a nuisance factor in health research because

it may tap as psychologically important, but organical
ly it remains a spurious variance in physical symptom
measures.

Because self-reported measures of stress and

health both contain a significant NA component, the

relationship between such measures is likely to be
overstated or hide the true associations between stress

and health and self-esteem and health.

If this research were to be replicated, another
selection of subjects must be considered, such as

university students.

The subjects of this study were

not randomly selected, but rather self-selected as they
were patients at a clinic treating stress-related

disorders.

Further, the psychological test battery

should include at least one self-esteem measure, (i.e.,
Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Inventory (Rosenberg, 1965),
Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (Roid & Fitts, 1988), or

Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (Coopersmith, 1967),

a trait measure for negative affect (i.e., Eysenck
Personality Inventory Neuroticism Scale (Eysenck &
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Eysenck, 1968), Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor,
1951) or Tellegen's Multidimensional Personality Ques

tionnaire (Tellegen, 1982), and a positive affect trait

measure (i.e.. Positive Emotionality Scale from Telle
gen's Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire).^
Since all currently accepted self-esteem measures are
self-reported, the MCSDS (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964)
should be used as a control for defensiveness.

physical health measures would remain the same.

The

Evalu

ation of the results should not only be examined glo
bally, but also for sex differences.

This study reflects the difficulty of collecting
arousal data for comparison with social or personality

variables.

The use of self-reported measures is a

widely accepted form of research due to its inexpensive
cost and ease of administration.

The results, however,

are filtered through the subject's moods states and
self-perceptions.

Since both types of data (self

reports and some physiological data, i.e., cholesterol
and leukocyte tests) cannot be collected simultaneous

ly, changes in mood and arousal can easily occur even
when the two types of data are collected concurrently.

Aversive emotional states such as negative affect

are affective responses to self-devaluing experiences
and subjective distress (Kaplan, 1975; Watson & Clark,
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1984) and low self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965).

Although

negative affect is considered a diffuse, nonspecific
measure of subjective distress and dissatisfaction, it
is considered a common measure of low self-esteem

(Watson & Clark, 1984).

This data supports Watson and Pennebaker (1989)
that negative affect and thereby, low self-esteem, is
more a general trait of somatopsychic distress ex

pressed over a broad range of affective states.

Somat

ic complaints act as a nuisance in health research,

clouding the true associations between self-esteem and
physical health.
It may be that, in fact, self-esteem is related
only to self-evaluated assessments of health, and not
to actual health.

On the other hand, if self-esteem

had been measured independently in positive as well as

negative terms, it would have provided a better test of
the relationship between self-esteem and physical
health than what was available.

The relationship

between self-esteem and physical health requires more
valid measures of self-esteem, as well as more research

using other than subjective measures of health.
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APPENDIX A.

SELF-ESTEEM QUESTIONNAIRE - PILOT STUDY
USE A

#2

PENCIL ONLY FOR YOUR ANSWERS.

ANY

OTHER PENCIL FOR INK MARK WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.
USE ONLY THE

SCAN

SHEET

FOR YOUR ANSWERS.

MARKS ON THE PRINTED QUESTIONNAIRE WILL NOT BE USED.
RETURN BOTH THE SCAN SHEET AND QUESTIONNAIRE.

THANK

YOU.

PART A: On this part of the questionnaire are groups
of stateinents. Please read the entire group of state
ments of each category^

Then pick out the ONE state

ment in that group which best describes the way you
feel today, that is, RIGHT NOWl. MARK YOUR ANSWER A^
Ix. C or D ^ THE SCAN SHEET ATTACHED TO THE TEST. If

several statements in the group seem to apply equally
well, mark each one.

Be sure to read all the statements in each group
before making your choice.
1.

a.

(Beck-Sadness)*
I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.

b.

I am blue or sad all the time and I can't snap

c.
d.

out of it.
I feel sad or blue.
I do not feel sad.

2.

a.
b.
c.
d.

3.

(Beck-Pessimism)
I feel that the future is hopeless and that
things cannot improve.
I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
I feel discouraged about the future.
I am not particularly pessimistic or
discouraged about the future.

b.

(Beck-Sense of Failure)
I feel I am a complete failure as a person
(parent, husband, wife).
As I look back on ny life, all I can see is

c.

I feel I have failed more than the average

d.

I do not feel like a failure.

a.

a lot of failures.
person.
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4.

(Beck-Dissatisfaction)

a.
b.

I am dissatisfied with evearything.
I don't get satisfaction out of anything

c.
d.

I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
I am not particularly dissatisfied.

a.

I hate myself.

b.
c.
d.

I am disgusted with myself.
I am disappointed with myself.
I don't feel disappointed with myself.

a.

I would kill myself if I had the chance.

b.

I have definite plans about committing

c.

suicide.
I feel I would be better off dead.

d.

I don't have any thoughts of harming nyself.

a.

I have lot all of my interest in other people

b.

c.

I have lost more of my interest in other
people and have little feeling for them.
I am less interested in other people than I

d.

I have not lost interest in other people.

a.
b.
c.

I can't make any decisions at all anymore.
I have great difficulty in making decisions.
I try to put off making decisions.

d.

I make decisions about as well as ever.

a.
b.

(Beck-Self-Image Change)
I feel that I am ugly or repulsive-looking.
I feel that there are permanent changes in

anymore.

5.

(Beck-Self-Dislike)

6.

(Beck-Self-Harm)

7.

(Beck-Social Withdrawal)
and don't care about them at all.

used to be.

8.

(Beck-Indecisiveness)

9.

my appearance and they make me look
unattractive.

c.

I am worried that I am looking old or

d.

I don't feel that I look any worse that I

unattractive.
used to.
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PART B;

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS EITHER TRUE

OR FALSE.

BE SURE YOU MARK YOUR SCAN SHEET IN THE

APPROPRIATE CIRCLE - (T) TRUE OR (F) FALSE.

10.

11.

At times I think I am not good at all.
(Rosenberg)

I am more sensitive than most other people.
(Rosenberg)

12.

13.

I cannot keep my mind on one thing. (Taylor)

All in all I am included to£eei that I am a
failure. (Rosenberg)

14.

I cannot keep my mind on one thing. (Taylor)

15.

I certainly feel useless at times. (Rosenberg)

16.

I have periods of such great restlessness that I
cannot set long in a chair. (Taylor)

17.

I feel that I am a person of worth at least on
an equal basis with others. (Rosenberg)

18.

I am inclined to take things hard. (Taylor)

19.

I take a positive attitude toward myself.
(Rosenberg)

20.

Life is a strain for me much of the time. (Taylor)

21.

I certainly feel useless much of the time.
(Taylor)

22.

I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces.
(Taylor)

23.

I feel that I have a nuirber of good qualities.
(Rosenberg)

24.

I have sometimes felt that difficulties were

piling up so high that I could not overcome them.
(Taylor)

25.

I feel anxiety about something or someone almost
all the time. (Taylor)
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26.

On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
(Rosenberg)

27.

I frequently find nyself worrying about something.
(Taylor)

28.

I am able to do things as well as most other
people. (Rosenberg)

29.

I shrink from facing a crisis of difficulty.
(Taylor)

30.

I am certainly lacking in self-confidence.
(Taylor)

31.

I wish I could have more respect for myself.
(Rosenberg)

32.

I am happy most of the time. (Taylor)

33.

At times I think I am no good at all. (Taylor)

34.

I believe I am no more nervous than most others.

(Taylor)

PART C; Below is a list of problems and complaints
that people have. Read each one carefully, and select
one of the nuirbered descriptors that best describes HOW
MUCH DISCOMFORT THAT PROBLEM HAS CAUSED YOU DURING THE
PAST WEEK INCLUDING TODAY.

OR E ^ THE SCAN SHEET.

MARK YOUR ANSWER A. B, C. D

BE CAREFUL THAT YOU ARE

MARKING YOUR ANSWER ON THE CORRECT LINE. Do not skip
any items, and mark your answer clearly. If you change
your mind, erase your first answer completely. Read
the example below before beginning.

EXAMPLE

Descriptors;
HOW MUCH ARE YOU DISTRESS BY;

Answer
Ex.

Not at all
A little bit

C
D
E

Moderately
Quite a bit
Extremely

Ex.

Body aches

35.

Feeling that others do not understand you or
are unsympathetic. (SCL-R-90)
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C

A
B

36.

Feeling that people are unfriendly or dislike you.
(SCL-R-90)

37;

Feeling inferior to others. (SCL-R-90)

38.

Feeling uneasy when people are watching or talking
about you. (SCL-R-90)

39.

Feeling very self-conscious with others.
(SCL-R-9Q)

40.

Feeling uncomfortable about eating or drinking
in public. (SCL-R-90)

41.

Repeated unpleasant thoughts that won't leave
your mind. (SCL-R-90)

42.

Difficulty making decisions. (SCL-R-90)

43.

Thoughts ending your life.

(SCL-R-90)
/

44.

Crying easily.

(SCL-R-90)

45.

Feeling of being trapped or caught. (SCL-R-90)

46.

Blaming yourself for things. (SCL-R-90)

47.

Feeling hopeless about the future. (SCL-R-90)

48.

Feeling of worthlessness. (SCL-R-90)

IF YOU HAVE AMY COMMENTS REGARDING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE,

PLEASE FEEL FREE TO LIST THEM BELOW:

Note:

Parentheses denote the test source the item was

taken from, i.e.. Beck (Beck Depression Inventory),
Taylor (Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale), or Rosenberg
(Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale).

However, the notation

did not appear on the actual test.
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APPENDIX B *

MARLOWE-CROWN SOCIAL DESIRABILITY SCALE

Please read each statement and decide whether you
feel in general that it is mostly true as applied to
you or mostly false. Please circle the appropriate
letter (T^true, F-False) directly to the right of each
statement. Answer "True" to positively stated ques
tions if they are true as often or more often than
stated. For example, answer "True" to "Occasionally, I
play poker" if you play occasionally or more often.

1.

I am sometimes irritated by people who
ask favors of me.

2.

1.

T

F

Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the
qualifications of all the candidates.
2. T

F

3.

I sometime think when people have a misfortune
they only got what they deserved.
3. T F

4.

I like to gossip at times.

4.

T

F

5.

On occasion I have had doubts about my
ability to succeed in life.

5.

T

F

advantage of someone.

6.

T

F

I have never intensely disliked
anyone.

7.

T

F

I never make a long trip without checking
the safety of my car.
8.

T

F

I am always courteous, even with people
who are disagreeable.
9.

T

F

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

There have been occasions when I took

On a few occasions, I have given up doing
something because I thought too little of
my ability.
10. T
I am always careful about my manner
of dress.

12.

F

11. T

F

12. T

F

I have never felt that I was punished
without a cause.
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13.

14.

When I don't know sortiething, I don't mind
admitting it.
13. T
I never resent being asked to return a
favor.

15.

16.

F

14. T

F

I sometimes try to get even, rather than
forgive and forget.
15. T

F

If I could get into a movie without paying
and be sure I was not seen, I would probably
do it.

17.

18.

19.

16. T

F

I have never deliberately said something
that hurt someone's feelings.
17. T

F

I can remember "playing sick" to get out
of something.
18. T

F

I sometimes feel resentful when I don't

get iry way.

20.

,

24.

27.

28.

F

F

I have never been irked when people express
ideas very different from my own.
23. T

F

My table manners at home are as good as
24. T

F

There have been occasions when I felt like

smashing things.
26.

21. T

22. T

when I eat out in a restaurant.
25.

F

There have been times when I was quite jealous
of the good fortune of others.

23.

20. T

I always try to practice what I
preach.

22.

F

No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always

a good listener.
21.

19. T

25. T

F

I never hesitate to go out of my way to
help someone in trouble.
26. T

F

It is sometimes hard for me to go on with
my work if I,am not encouraged.
27. T

F

I'm always willing to admit it when I make
a mistake.

28. T

87

F

29.

There have been times when I felt like rebelling
against people in authority even though I knew

they were right.
30.

29. T

I have almost never felt the urge to tell
someone off.

31.

F

30. T

F

I would never think of letting someone else
be punished for rry wrong-doings.
31. T

F
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